WOLFLAND

I can't even remember how long it has been since i even bothered to touch this thing...

 

Time flies, and it seems i put my "occupation" as a drug dealer at some point in undergrad years, seemingly distant past, while ironically, I have been dealing with drugs for the most part of the summer and maybe for the rest of my career... some prophet, am I

 

Can't believe how many things have changed, saw the Saint seiya pics i upload so long ago, well i'm still into it. Saw the NY trip diary I wrote, and i'l be in NYC again in a couple weeks.

 

Seems i'm trying to chase myself, follow my own foot print, like a big circle.

啊！！！

有时半年没碰blog了，我实在是太懒了！NOW MAKING THE GRAND REAPPEARANCE TO THE WORLD OF MSN BLOG!

大家掌声鼓励！

The MET collection of impressionism paintings could all be traced back to the art dealer Vollard.

 

Being a law student, he was inspired by Cezane's work, which led him to his future career path.

 

Like he said, being an art dealer is awesome because the job itself allows one to be among those beautiful arts all the time.

明天是在纽约逗留的最后一天。

 

决定再去一次MET(ROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ARTS), 有塞尚和毕加索的画展。

 

本来是要去Brooklyn Museum of Arts的，结果..............CLOSED ON TUESDAYS!!!!!!!!!!!!! DOH!!!!!

 

下次要早做计划。

Decided not to catch the new year hype at time square.

 

But went there in the afternoon just to witness the population :P

 

果然是水泄不通啊..........都TMD戒严了。

 

还是回家看电视吧。

 

HAPPY NEW YEAR EVERYONE!

不出所料，萨达姆服刑之后不到二十四小时，伊拉克连续发生三起自杀性爆炸，七十人死亡。

 

暴力带来的是变本加厉的暴力。

 

以下附上CNN的社论：

 

Jan. 8, 2007 issue - The saga of Saddam's end—his capture, trial and execution—is a sad metaphor for America's occupation of Iraq. What might have gone right went so wrong. It is worth remembering that Saddam Hussein was not your run-of-the-mill dictator. He created one of the most brutal, corrupt and violent regimes in modern history, something akin to Stalin's Soviet Union, Mao's China or Kim Jong Il's North Korea. Whatever the strategic wisdom for the United States, deposing him began as something unquestionably good for Iraq.

But soon the Bush administration dismissed the idea of trying Saddam under international law, or in a court with any broader legitimacy. This is the administration, after all, that could see little advantage to a United Nations mandate for its own invasion and occupation. It put Saddam's fate in the hands of the new Iraqi government, dominated by Shiite and Kurdish politicians who had been victims of his reign. As a result, Saddam's trial, which should have been the judgment of civilized society against a tyrant, is now seen by Iraq's Sunnis and much of the Arab world as a farce, reflecting only the victors' vengeance.

This was not inevitable. Most Iraqis were happy to see Saddam out of power. In the months after the American invasion, support for the Coalition Provisional Authority topped 70 percent. This was so even among Iraq's Sunni Arabs. In the first months of the insurgency, only 14 percent of them approved of attacks on U.S. troops. (That number today is 70 percent.) The rebellious area in those early months was not (Sunni) Fallujah but (Shiite) Najaf.

But during those crucial first months, Washington disbanded the Iraqi Army, fired 50,000 bureaucrats and shut down the government-owned enterprises that employed most Iraqis. In effect, the United States dismantled the Iraqi state, leaving a deep security vacuum, administrative chaos and soaring unemployment. That state was dominated by Iraq's Sunni elites, who read this not as just a regime change but a revolution in which they had become the new underclass. For them, the new Iraq looked like a new dictatorship.

Why Washington made such profound moves with such little forethought remains one of the many puzzles of the Bush administration's foreign policy. Some of the decision making was motivated by ideology: Baathism equaled fascism, so every school teacher who joined the Baath Party to get a job was seen as a closet Nazi; state-owned enterprises were bad, the new Iraq needed a flat tax, etc. Some of it was influenced by Shiite exiles who wanted to take total control of the new Iraq. Some of it simply reflected the bizarre combination of ignorance and naivete that has marked the policies of Bush's "tough guys."

The administration has never fully understood the sectarian nature of its policies, which were less "nation building" than they were "nation busting" in their effects. It kept insisting that it was building a national army and police force when it was blatantly obvious (even to columnists) that the forces were overwhelmingly Shiite and Kurdish, mostly drawn from militias with stronger loyalties to political parties than to the state. The answer to these fundamentally political objections was technocratic: more training. But a stronger Shiite Army made—makes—the Sunni populace more insecure and willing to support the insurgency.

Iraq's Sunnis are not the good guys in this story. They have mostly behaved like self-defeating thugs. The minority of Sunnis who support Al Qaeda have been truly barbarous. The point, however, is not their vices but our stupidity. We summarily deposed not just Saddam Hussein but a centuries-old ruling elite and then were stunned that they reacted poorly. In contrast, on coming into power in South Africa, Nelson Mandela did not fire a single white bureaucrat or soldier—and not because he thought that they had been kind to his people. He correctly saw the strategy as the way to prevent an Afrikaner rebellion.

It has now become fashionable among Washington neoconservatives to blame the Iraqis for everything that has happened to their country. "We have given the Iraqis a republic and they do not appear able to keep it," laments Charles Krauthammer. Others invoke anthropologists to explain the terrible dysfunctions of Iraqi culture. There may be some truth to all these claims—Iraq is a tough place—but the Bush administration is not quite so blameless. It thoughtlessly engineered a political and social revolution as intense as the French or Iranian one and then seemed surprised that Iraq could not digest it happily, peaceably and quickly. We did not give them a republic. We gave them a civil war.

一个独裁者伏法了，但总觉得这只意味着一种暴力杀戮的轮回。

 

绞刑这种原始的刑罚，不知世界上还有几个国家在使用。

 

美国只有为数不多的几个州还没有取消死刑，而死刑也是以注射毒剂的方式执行的。 我不能理解国际法庭为何一定要以绞刑终结萨达姆的生命。

 

退一步讲，无论何种形式的死刑都是要以暴力作为对施暴者的惩罚。 如此的循环往复，我们的世界将永远暴力横行。

 

这个问题一直困扰着人类吧，用一句被滥用已久的俗语来讲：冤冤相报何时了。

 

Saddam was charged and convicted for the lives of 148 Shia Muslim men, but how many people was killed during the US initiated invasion to Iraq. These Iraqi and Coalition sodiers lost their lives.

 

What should be done to President Bush?